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ABSTRACT
Ontario has seen significant changes across the municipal landscape, including the
realignment of service responsibilities. One of the products of this realignment was the
introduction of the CMSM program in 1998, which saw local municipalities take on the
responsibilities for many services, including land ambulance.
Land ambulance is an important life-saving service (Aringhieri et al. 2017). Decision-makers
must ensure that such services must be delivered with optimal performance. As a public service
in Ontario, this includes democratic performance. Crucial to the anchorage of democratic
performance is accountability.
Accountability is a transaction of information, dialogue, and rewards/sanctions (Brandsma
and Schillemans 2012). It is an important component of democracy. While much attention has
been paid to accountability at the provincial and federal levels, there is a growing body of
research into accountability at the local level (Spicer 2017; Arnbuckle 2018).
This study aims to contribute to this growing body of literature by considering the vital
service of land ambulance and the unique institutions of city-county separation along with the
imposed CMSM program.
By asking the question “In areas where city-county institutions are established, to what extent
is the accountability gap in land ambulance services agreements effected by the governance
model of the service provider”, this study contributes to the empirical data around accountability,
inter-municipal agreements, and SPBs.
Through a quantitative test and description, this paper first quantifies the extent of
accountability in 13 city-county services, confirming that while land-ambulance services
generally perform well, governance structures do correlate with improved performance.
Additionally, using a comparative case study, this study qualitatively describes the findings in
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two similar municipalities with different governance structures, supporting the GAT findings and
describing how municipalities can improve their accountability.
In sum, this paper finds that in the 13 agreements/services studied, SPB governance
structures have superior performance to direct and contract delivery. However, partnerships that
have or can produce annual reports, create clear complaints processes, establish joint committees
(or boards) with representation from all partner municipalities, do correlate with a strong
performance in accountability.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1990s, Ontario underwent significant changes across the municipal
landscape. In particular, the election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1995 was elected
on a promise to lower taxes (Ibbitson 1997). To accomplish this, the Province pursued the
elimination and amalgamation of municipalities (Siegel 2005). Further, Ontario set out to upload
and download services with municipalities (Graham and Phillips 1998). Accordingly, one of the
tools used by the Province was the introduction of the CMSM system in 1998, under the Local
Services Realignment framework (Ontario 1998). With the creation of the CMSM system, local
municipalities took on delivery and partial funding role in many services (Spicer 2015). The
Provincial government “downloaded” these responsibilities, in an effort to, among other reasons,
improve fiscal efficiency (Ontario 1999). The services that municipalities found themselves
responsible for were social housing, childcare, social assistance, public health, and land
ambulance.
In total, the province created 37 CMSMs for southern Ontario, along with 10 district
social services boards in northern Ontario. These CMSMs in effect forced inter-municipal
services agreements, as designated CMSMs became responsible for service delivery for their
neighbouring municipalities (Spicer 2015). Previous research has been completed measuring
accountability in these types of relationships (Spicer 2017, Lyons and Spicer 2018). Further,
research has been completed on CMSM organizations (Spicer 2015, Spicer 2016) in Ontario.
What remains to be studied, however, are the relationships specific to land ambulance service,
which was “downloaded” as part of this provincial realignment.
Consequently, the Harris government in Ontario downloaded land-ambulance delivery
from the province to designated CMSM’s. This decision was in part due to findings of the 1998
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Ontario Auditor General’s report, which highlights accountability as one of the goals of local
services realignment (Ontario 1998; Prno 2002). With the stated goal of increasing
accountability, one should question if this is achieved equally despite the governance model that
the CMSM chooses for land ambulance delivery.
Land ambulance services are important. Paramedics provide care throughout Ontario,
through land and air ambulance services, to residents daily and play a vital role in saving lives by
reducing the rate of mortality and morbidity (Aringhieri et al. 2017). Notably, modern paramedic
services have decreased the mortality from a heart attack from 8.9 percent to just 1.9 percent (Le
May et al. 2006). Crucially, paramedic care is common throughout Ontario. In 2018, provincial
data reveals that 1,151,360 patients were transported by paramedics (Ontario, 2019).
Land ambulance delivery models affect their democratic performance (Longeway 2020).
Democratic performance can include measures such as authorization, efficiency, or
accountability, and there has been longstanding interest in measuring and analyzing these
performance criteria within public agencies (Boyne 2006). Decision-makers must be informed by
research to decide which model is best for the service being provided. Unfortunately, despite the
equally important service they provide, land ambulance services have not received the same
attention as has been paid to the delivery models for police and fire services (Found 2012;
Sancton 2015). Delivery models for ambulance services in Canada vary by province. In many
provinces, responsibility has been retained by the Province for land ambulance services (BC
Health Services 2020; Longeway 2020). Other provinces, such as Alberta, have regionalized the
provision of land ambulance services through a combination of Health Authorities and Fire
Departments (Health Quality Council of Alberta 2013). As previously stated, Ontario land
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ambulance delivery is the responsibility of municipalities, designated by the Province
(Ambulance Act R.S.O 1990).
Ontario has 55 designated land ambulance services. These services are delivered in the following
models;


Counties with separated cities (13)



Two-tier municipalities, delivered by the Upper-Tier (11)



Northern district social services boards (10)



Single tier municipalities (8)



Indigenous leadership within designated Indian Reserves (6)



The regional municipality (6)



Two separated cities, where one is designated the CMSM (1)

In this study, focus will be paid on counties containing separated cities. In each of the 13
services covering counties with separated cities, one of the municipalities has been designated
the CMSM for land ambulance services. It is not consistent who the designated CMSM is
between the county or the separated city. In Guelph-Wellington for example, Guelph is the
designated agent. Whereas in Frontenac-Kingston, Frontenac County administers land
ambulance service. Further complicating this is the delivery model chosen by the CMSM. In
Middlesex-London, Middlesex County has formed an ambulance special-purpose board (SPB) to
deliver service. Of the remaining 12 services, three are delivered through contracting service
delivery, with the balance delivered directly by the municipality.
This paper seeks to measure the relative accountability of land ambulance services, provided
in Ontario under CMSM agreements. To accomplish this, the paper will use a modified
Governance Assessment Tool (GAT) to operationalize the performance of each ambulance
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service included in the study. What follows the qualitative section is a case comparison between
Middlesex-London Paramedic Service (MLPS) and Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services
(EWEMS). By using a modified GAT to quantitatively measure these inter-municipal
relationships, and by comparing the various models delivered in this group, predictors of strong
performance can be sought. What’s more, taking these predictors and examining case examples
will further support the GAT findings.
This paper intends to further strengthen the academic literature on CMSM agreements, vital
municipal service delivery, and the GAT as a tool for measuring. It also aims to inform
municipalities who are charged with the responsibility for land ambulance delivery in Ontario,
by providing predictors of a strong framework for accountability. Through quantitative and case
analysis, this work finds that there is variation, consistent with previous research (Spicer 2017;
Lyons and Spicer 2018) in the so-called “accountability and transparency gap” (Spicer 2017, pp.
389) across the 13 land ambulance services studied. Additionally, that this variation has
identifiable characteristics, easily deployed by municipalities, that predict strong democratic
performance in accountability.
CHAPTER 2 - REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
2.1 Accountability
Accountability is broadly defined as an “obligation to answer for the performance of duties”
(Badie et al. 2011, pp. 1). For this paper, I will be considering political accountability. Political
accountability is generally regarded as a symbol of representative democracy, requiring those
exercising the public’s authority to be evaluated (Spicer 2017). The so-called principal-agent
relationship, where the principal is the voter and the agent is the elected official or administrative
staff member (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012; Lyons 2020). Fearon described this as, “person
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A is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are met. First, there is an understanding that A
is obligated to act in some way on behalf of B. Second, B is empowered by some formal
institution or perhaps informal rules to sanction or reward A for her activities or performance in
this capacity” (1999, pp. 55). After all, accountability has no power or authority without a system
of rewards or enforcement (Lyons 2020).
Research by Ebrahim and Weisband, extrapolate accountability to four components;
transparency, answerability, compliance, and enforcement (2007). Where information must be
collected and made public for scrutiny. Actions or inactions must then be justified through
reasoning for questioning. Evaluation of procedures and outcomes findings must be reported,
where the application of sanctions may be imposed for shortcomings (Ebrahim and Weisband
2007; Spicer 2017).
While there have been significant amounts of research on political accountability, much of
this work has been completed at the provincial and federal levels of government (Arnbuckle
2018). Where there have been studies looking at municipal level accountability, most of it has
been done in the context of the United States (Breux and Couture 2018).
Canadian municipal context has been accumulating in recent years and helps to provide some
basis for this paper. In 2014, scholar Sancton’s analysis of municipal elections demonstrated
“that the conventional model (principal-agent) for such accountability involves attentive voters
informed…about the actions of local elected members of council. It is easy to see how this
model fails…it was difficult for voters to monitor the actions of their local non-partisan council”
(2018, pp. 146). Voters reinforce mechanisms of accountability since they are able to judge the
government based on the implementation of electoral promises (Breux and Couture 2018).
Further, Spicer added to the Canadian empirical evidence when he measured accountability and
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transparency with inter-municipal service agreements (2017). Spicer concludes that these
agreements score poorly in part due to public access measures, and states that “holding agents to
account requires a supply of information” (2017, pp. 391). Putting these concepts together,
Arnbuckle explores accountability through the Ontario Integrity Commissioner, where among
other findings reveals “[the] lack of information at the municipal level reoccurs as the theme in
the overall ability for the municipal voter to hold politicians to account” (2018, pp. 8).
Interestingly, in 2020, Lyons explores accountability for Canadian Special Purpose Boards
(SPBs). He concludes that although information is often more available to voters (Lyons and
Spicer 2018), sanctions can be difficult to apply as SPBs are further removed from their line of
sight (Lyons 2020).
Accountability is an interchange of information, dialogue, and rewards/sanctions (Brandsma
and Schillemans 2012). However, what many researchers have found is ultimately a lack of
information being provided to the principal/voter (Spicer 2017; Sancton 2018; Arnbuckle 2018).
When information is available, such as the case for SPBs, rewards, and sanctions can be difficult
to apply (Lyons 2020). From these findings, this paper will continue to build on the literature that
attempts to measure accountability in the Canadian municipal context, using land ambulance
service agreements.
2.2 Special Purpose Boards (SPBs)
When the term government is used, the first thing that often comes to people’s minds is
national, state, and perhaps municipal governments. Rarely do people think about SPBs (Lyons
2020) even though conservative estimations suggest that there are approximately 8,000 SPBs
across Canada (Richmond and Siegel 1994; Tindal and Tindal 2004; Sancton 2015; Lyons 2020).
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Despite being extremely common, they are often less visible than general-purpose governments
(Sancton 2015).
The question of what SPBs are and why they exist requires further discussion. First, it should
be noted that significant variation in how SPBs can be formed (Sanction 2015; Lyons 2020)
exists. However, for the purposes of this paper, it will be limited to the Canadian context. Within
Canada, the formation of SPBs is limited to federal and provincial governments, as well as
municipalities (Richmond and Siegel 1994; Lyons 2015). SPBs are very similar to local
governments, however, they are limited to a single function or purpose (Siegel 1994a; Sancton
2015; Lyons 2020). Examples of common SPBs are police or library boards. Secondly, SPBs
can be established across multiple jurisdictions (Sancton 2015), and are at times formed
intentionally when multiple municipalities or levels of government are involved.
Intergovernmental SPBs that a commonplace within the Canadian landscape is conservation
authorities. As Sancton notes, “institutions have generally been designed to help solve real
problems in the real world rather than to look neat on an organizational chart” (2015, pp.45).
This is true of conservation authorities where jurisdictional boundaries are decided based upon
watersheds, rather than municipal boundaries (Sancton 2015). Similarly, other scholars have
noted that SPBs are designed “around the geography of the problem” (Hooghe and Marks 2003;
Lyons 2020, pp. 145).
Although there is limited study on SPBs, there has been much debate around the “democratic
anchorage” of SPBs (Lyons 2020, pp.161). This is linked with the variation in board formation,
between elected and non-elected actors (Sancton 2015). Further, the debate concerning SPBs
between polycentrists and consolidationists is ongoing (Lyons 2015). Polycentrists argue for
cross-jurisdictional, functionally specialized institutions, where consolidationists prefer single,
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large general-purpose governments (Mullin 2009; Lyons 2015). With the focus of this paper
being accountability within Ontario land ambulance services, which provide service to counties
with separated cities, the scope of the literature review will set aside the polycentrist and
consolidationist debate. Rather, further exploration into the literature of inter-local/governmental
SPBs was completed.
The use of SPBs for service delivery is increasing, despite the lack of scholarly study into
SPBs and inter-local agreements (Lyons and Spicer 2018). Perhaps one of the reasons for the
increase in SPBs for service delivery can be explained by the work of Siegel who provides
factors for determining whether or not to deliver service through SPB (1994b). These factors are
“the need for multi-jurisdictional service area, intergovernmental coordination, organizational
flexibility, and arm’s-length decision-making (Siegel 1994b). These findings were supported by
Lyons when he concludes that SPBs who work across multiple jurisdictions, fulfill their mandate
better than SPBs within single governments (Lyons 2015).
Looking at the land ambulance sector within Ontario, many ambulance services provide care
to multiple municipalities. For a majority of these ambulance services, the circumstances
described by Siegel are not factors within the municipality designated as responsible for service
delivery. Examples of this are single-tier or two-tier systems, regional governments, and
Indigenous Indian Reserves. However, for counties with separated cities and Northern District
Services Boards, Siegel’s circumstances are present and the question about the value of SPBs
should be considered. Within the scope of this paper, studying the 13 land ambulance services in
counties with separated cities, one service has formed an SPB – MLPS.
2.3 Consolidated Municipal Service Managers (CMSMs)
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The ability to connect rural and urban areas continues to challenge provincial and municipal
policy makers due to the realities of economic and physical geography (Sweet 1999; Spicer
2016). As a result, both distinctive areas were provincially granted institutions for governance,
which further cemented their uniqueness and divide (Spicer 2016). “City-county separation was
the original method of organizing municipalities in the Province of Ontario” (Spicer 2014,
pp.245) and is a structure that continues today within the province (Spicer 2015). Despite these
institutional and geographical differences throughout Ontario, Provincial policy requires that all
444 municipalities (Lyons 2020) work together to deliver services deemed to be partially or
wholly the responsibility of local governments (Graham and Phillips 1998; Spicer 2015).
How municipalities in Ontario work together is largely based upon their local governance
structures. Ontario examples include single-tier municipalities, regional governments, two-tier
systems, or the aforementioned city-county scenarios. Regardless of the local circumstances,
Ontario introduced the Consolidated Municipal Services Manger system, as a means for
designating the responsibility for service delivery to one municipality (Spicer 2015). These
CMSM designations that were introduced in 1998 also included the responsibility for partial
funding of these services (Spicer 2015). This in effect, was the Provincial government's method
of realigning provincial services and downloading financial and oversight responsibilities to the
municipal governments, as part of their “Common Sense Revolution” election promises (Graham
and Phillips 1998; Spicer 2014, 2015).
With the implementation of the CMSM program, the result for many areas, such as regional
or two-tier municipalities, was a very clear and sensible pathway (Spicer 2014) to “who does
what” (Graham and Phillips 1998). However, this was not the case for city-county communities,
where analysis demonstrated variation in how CMSM arrangements would be decided (Spicer
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2015). “Unlike other municipalities in the province, the [Provincial] government did not provide
guidelines for how separated cities and counties would divide related costs and
responsibilities…[leading] in some cases, multiple CMSM agreements to cover [all] policy
responsibilities” (Spicer 2014, pp. 250). Suddenly, municipalities separated by design were
foisted into service partnerships. What’s more, these service responsibilities under the Local
Services Realignment (Ontario 1999), were important and indeed expensive services to deliver
(Spicer 2014), including social services and land ambulance (Ontario 1998a; Prno 2002).
The study into CMSM agreements is very limited, likely due to their uniqueness within
Ontario. However, what has been studied is the prevalence of these agreements, which
demonstrates that while city-county relationships scarcely use formal inter-municipal
agreements, the majority of agreements in place are CMSMs (Spicer 2014). Further, studies have
demonstrated that the unique city-county separation within Ontario posed a hindrance to the
implementation of the CMSM program, leading to local frustration and costly arbitrations
(Spicer 2015). Finally, empirical research has been conducted on the accountability and
transparency of inter-municipal agreements and SPBs, of which some form part of the CMSM
program (Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018).
In sum, CMSMs were implemented by the Province of Ontario as a mechanism for
downloading services to municipalities. While these agreements are commonplace provincially,
they are not well studied (Spicer 2015). There is a further paucity of literature where CMSM
agreements meet city-county separation, where governance structures appear to improve the
accountability of inter-local cooperation (Lyons and Spicer 2018).
2.4 Governance Assessment Tool (GAT)
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There has been longstanding interest in measuring and analyzing the performance of public
agencies (Boyne 2006). This is particularly true when it comes to cooperative service
agreements, as researchers have described an indistinct line of accountability whenever a single
government is not solely responsible for service delivery (Lyons and Spicer 2018). As previously
mentioned, the practice of inter-governmental and inter-local cooperation agreements is
increasing (Spicer 2015). What’s more, the types of services that are being cooperatively
delivered, such as emergency protection, are important (Spicer 2017). Formal agreements for this
service delivery are normally established and described among other responsibilities, financial
obligations (Andrew 2008, 2009). However, with such vital services being delivered in this
manner, scholars need to understand the extent to which accountability is being impacted.
To better measure the “accountability and transparency gap” (Spicer 2017, pp.389) with
cooperation agreements, many researchers have made different attempts at this aim.
Accountability is a challenging concept to empirically measure, largely related to the variability
with governments and institutions (Lyons and Spicer 2018). Some scholars have attempted to
measure accountability expectations (Wang 2002), the degree to which levied sanctions have
enforced standards (Henretty and Koop 2011), and studies into mapping accountability networks
(Brandsma and Schillemans 2012). However, in recent years, a modified Governance
Assessment Tool (GAT) has been used in the Ontario local government context to build
empirical evidence concerning such cooperative agreements, as well as their related governance
structures.
Originally developed by Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith (2005), the GAT was operationalized
to measure the democratic performance of various public services through cooperative
agreements in the United Kingdom. While all agreements are committed to delivering service to

20

the public, not all delivery agents are as committed to their democratic performance (Lyons and
Spicer 2018). Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith implemented their GAT to provide empirical data,
measuring the degree of accountability and transparency. The original tool (see Table 2.1)
comprised of criteria for public access internal governance, member conduct, and external
accountability. All of which was determined to be a basic and achievable framework for
accountability (Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith 2005; Lyons and Spicer 2018). If we return to the
conceptualization by Ebrahim and Weisband on accountability (2007), the GAT provides
critique for criteria concerning; transparency, answerability, compliance, and enforcement
(Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith 2005; Ebrahim and Weisband 2007).
Table 2.1

Governance Assessment Criteria
A.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
B.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
C.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
D.
1.

Public Access
Are meetings of the board advertised?
Are meetings of the board open to the press and public?
Are the public entitled to see reports considered by the board?
Are the reports that the board will consider available for the public to consult prior to the
meeting?
Are the public entitled to see minutes of the board meetings?
Is there an annual general meeting that the public can attend?
Internal Governance
Does the partnership have a memorandum of association or other document defining its role
and powers?
Does the partnership have a written constitution or set of standing orders defining how it will
conduct business at meetings?
Is membership for a limited period of time?
Does a quorum apply at board meetings?
Are written minutes of board meetings produced?
Are there allowances or other payments for members?
Member Conduct
Is there a code of conduct to regulate the behaviour of members at board meetings?
If there is a code, are board members required to agree to be bound by it?
Is there a register in which board members detail their financial and other interests?
Is there a system for declaring conflicts of interest at meetings?
Is there a procedure for ensuring that members declaring conflicts of interest take no part in
the decision?
Accountability
Does the partnership have to prepare an annual report?
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Does the partnership have to prepare an annual budget?
Does the partnership have to prepare annual accounts?
Is the partnership subject to external audit?
Is the partnership subject to external inspection?
Is there a complaints process available to citizens or service users?
Is the partnership under the jurisdiction of an ombudsmen or inspectorate?
Is the partnership required to meet targets agreed with any other bodies?
Does the partnership take a formal report to any other bodies?
Can members be recalled by their nominating bodies?

Source: Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith (2005)

What is of particular help in answering the research question of this paper, is the modified
GAT (Lyons 2014; Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018). The need for a modification by
Canadian researchers (see table 3.2) was a result of the nature of municipal agreements within
Ontario, which are often are less complex than the original partnerships studied in the United
Kingdom (Spicer 2017). What follows in the Canadian context are three studies which
demonstrate overall poor accountability and transparency with inter-municipal service
partnerships, with improved performance in these agreements when an SPB governance structure
is in place (Lyons 2014; Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018). It is expected that this study will
find similar conclusions to these Canadian analyses. Ideally, further adding to the empirical data
on SPBs and inter-municipal agreements, while providing the new context of CMSM agreements
in counties with separated cities.
CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Aim and Question
The review of the above literature provides an overall context as it relates to accountability
with CMSM agreements, and how governance structures affect accountability in inter-local
agreements more broadly. Additionally, this review highlights the gaps where further study can
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be targeted in order to add empirical evidence to both the data on Ontario’s city-county CMSM
agreements and SPBs.
With the commonality of CMSM agreements throughout Ontario and the uniqueness of citycounty separation, the incentive to study this relatively unexplored area clear. Does the
combination of such agreements and these institutions hold up to a test of accountability?
Generally, this research aims to better understand these ideas, and provide both scholars and
practitioners with more evidence to guide future policy in this area.
As previously presented in the literature review, accountability matters. It is a hallmark of
our democratic governments (Spicer 2017). In the end, citizens want to know that the services
being provided are visible to them and that they have the ability to act if they are pleased or
dissatisfied with those services. This is particularly true when it comes to services that people
depend on during an emergency.
Vital services, such as land ambulance, are being delivered under CMSM agreements every
day throughout Ontario. This knowledge, along with the knowledge of the previously described
work on inter-local agreements and their effect on accountability, is critical that researchers aim
to explore the extent to which the accountability of vital services are affected by these
agreements.
The research question is therefore; In areas where city-county institutions are established, to
what extent is the accountability gap in land ambulance services agreements affected by the
governance model of the service provider?
3.2 Case Selection
Within the province of Ontario, there are 55 designated land ambulances, providing care
across all 444 municipalities. However, the scope of this project is intended to measure the
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CMSM agreements that are in place within communities that have city-county separation.
Therefore, for the GAT analysis portion of the study, the units of analysis will be the 13 land
ambulance services that meet these criteria. These services are listed in the table below (table
3.1);
Table 3.1
Cornwall

Leeds and Grenville

Elgin

Middlesex-London

Essex-Windsor

Perth

Frontenac-Kingston

Peterborough

Guelph-Wellington

Renfrew

Hastings

Simcoe

Lanark

Despite the limited number of cases meeting the scope of this project, there is good variation
in governance models and service delivery. Of the 13, one CMSM has established an SPB for
service delivery (Middlesex County). With the remaining 12, three are involved in some degree
of contracting-out (Elgin, Lanark, and Perth). Further, there is some variation in the number of
municipalities involved in each CMSM, from two to four municipalities.
For the next portion of this paper, a comparative case study analysis of a purposive sample of
two land ambulance services within Ontario will be undertaken using a cross-sectional
(snapshot) nested (mixed approached) research design. For this case selection, MiddlesexLondon’s land ambulance service is the first case selected as it is the only land ambulance
service governed by an SPB. In order to better understand how the SPB affects accountability

24

(dependent variable), it must be compared with a case where the municipality does not have an
SPB. To control for other variables, a land ambulance service with otherwise most similar
characteristics must be sought, in an attempt to best isolate the governance structure
(independent variable). For this purpose, Essex-Windsor-Pelee poses as a good comparator for
Middlesex-London. Most similar in population size, urban-rural ratio, large Ontario University
and College populations, and where both designated CMSM agents are the county
municipalities. Further, despite the small separated township of Pelee within Essex-Windsor,
both land-ambulance services provide care to one large rural upper-tier municipality and one
large separated city.
3.3 Data Sources
3.3.1 Governance Assessment Tool Analysis
The main source of data that was used to inform the completion of the GAT is the 13 CMSM
agreements themselves. All agreements are publically available as they are passed municipally, as bylaws. These documents were used to answer many of the criteria within the GAT, specifically those
pertaining to the domains of public access and internal governance.

To further aid the completion of the GAT, websites for the paramedic services and their
associated municipalities were used. This proves to be a great source of information, as this
information helps to inform the GAT domains of public access and accountability. Further, it is
similarly available to the public.
Combined, the agreements and website information are an eloquent way for this paper to
give me a similar sense of what is readily accessible to the public. Relying on this accessible
information gives a “fair” indication of what residents might expect for land ambulance service
information, which by nature of the GAT, belongs in the public sphere (Lyons and Spicer 2018).

25

3.3.2 Case Study Analysis
Information sources used to inform the two case reviews primarily comes from secondary
sources, such as council reports, CMSM agreements, media reports, Statistics Canada, municipal
website, and land ambulance service websites. The information on the two cases bolsters the GAT
findings, as well as informs how these agreements are working in practice.
3.4 Operationalizing Concepts
For this project, the researcher employs a positivist research ontology to quantitatively
test (hypothesis) and describe (what) the variations in accountability (Dependent Variable)
between city-county ambulance services, with different governance structures (Independent
Variable). It uses a deductive research strategy that has a mixed-method (nested) approach. The
paper first quantifies the extent of accountability in 13 city-county services, confirming broader
theoretical knowledge and previous quantitative findings. Secondly, using a comparative case
study, the paper employs a purposive selection and qualitatively describes the findings in two
similar municipalities. These findings of these municipalities, with separate governance
structures, support the GAT findings.
3.4.1 Governance Assessment Tool Analysis
In order to operationalize this study and measure the extent of accountability in 13 citycounty services, the GAT was used.
As previously described, the GAT was originally provided by Skelcher, Mathur, and
Smith (2005) was subsequently adapted by several researchers. Each looking at quantitative
studies of accountability and/or transparency in inter-governmental partnerships (Skelcher,
Mathur, and Smith 2005; Lyons 2014; Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018). The need for
Canadian researchers Spicer and Lyons to adapt the original tool was a result of the nature of
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municipal agreements within Ontario, which Spicer described as “often less complex than the
original partnerships studied in the United Kingdom” by Skelcher et al (2017, pp. 394).
Accordingly, for the purposes of this study being conducted within the Ontario context, the
modified GAT was selected.
Similar to the Canadian adaptations of the GAT, the scoring range from 0 to 1 (1 if a
criterion is met, 0.5 if partially met and 0 if not met) is used to measure and compare
accountability relationships (Lyons 2014; Spicer 2017). The GAT provides a score for each
criterion within three larger domains; public access, internal governance, and accountability. For
the study by Spicer (2017), these three domains each contained 5 criteria, allowing for a possible
score of 15 for each agreement. The original criteria included by Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith
(2005) had a possible score of 27 (see table 2.1).
For the purposes of this study, the modified tool used by Spicer (2017) was further
modified to include three further criteria (see table 3.2), felt to be relevant to the context of land
ambulance service delivery and to provide clearer detail for analysis.
Table 3.2

Modified Governance Assessment Criteria
A.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
B.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
C.
1.

Public Access
Are agreements available to the public?
Are provisions made to have public meetings?
Are the public entitled to see reports regarding performance?
Is a contact provided in the agreement?
Are the public entitled to see minutes of meetings?
Internal Governance
Does the agreement define specific roles for each partner?
Are meetings scheduled?
Are there written standards for communication?
Are there written standards for budgeting?
Do all municipalities have a voice through board/committee?
Are written meetings minutes required?
Accountability
Does the partnership have to prepare an annual report?
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Does the partnership have to prepare an annual budget?
Is the 2020 detailed approved budget available?
Is the partnership subject to external audit?
Is there a complaints process available to citizens or service users?
Does the partnership describe who represents each community?
Does the partnership describe who is financially responsible for service delivery?

Adapted
from:
Spicer (2017)

The added criteria were;
B5 – This question was added in order to better inform the research question. The question aims
to determine if governance structures affect the degree of accountability. Variations in this
criterion represent the extent of accountability that elected officials of municipalities who are not
designated the CMSM maintain for their communities.
C3 – This question was added to separate municipalities that were providing timely information
to their residents. This represents how forthcoming the municipality is with providing financial
information and serves as a snap-shot audit for municipalities not consistently providing
important information to their community.
C5 – Originally found in the work of Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith (2005), this question was felt
to be very relevant for a service as important to the community as land ambulance. Further, as
accountability was described above, the ability to readily provide positive or negative feedback
represents an important link in the chain of accountability.
In sum, this GAT provides the ability to remain consistent with previous studies in
Ontario, adding both external validity to the results of this study, as well as additional empirical
evidence to the body of work in this area.
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Following the completion of scoring using the above framework (see table 3.2), the
scores within each domain are tallied, then divided by their total possible score. The result is each
agreement receiving a score from 0.001 to 1.0 for each domain. Additionally, the sum of all criteria
was tallied and divided by the total possible score (18). These results were expressed from 0.01 to
1.0 for each agreement. Finally, the average score for each domain and the average overall score
were calculated.
The results were analyzed looking for comparisons between domain scores, against the
average. Where variation from the average was noted, results of the individual criterion were
reviewed, looking for trends that provided insight into better domain performance. Additionally,
total scores were compared with the average, and where variation was noted, results of the domains
were reviewed, looking for domain trends of overall performance. Overall, the evaluation of the
domains and total score help to infer the correlation between governance structure and
accountability performance.
3.4.2 Case Study Analysis
The units of analysis (two similar land ambulance services with different governance
structures) will be operationalized by utilizing a qualitative review, determining through
description how each agreement is working out in practice.
The process includes reviewing the GAT findings in detail for both cases, looking
specifically where one outperforms the other. Then reviewing these findings, bolstered by theory
and supported by practice, explain the findings of strong and poor performance. The focus on
these findings is linked to their models of governance.
The combination of qualitative findings anchored in the empirical GAT scores will be
used to support the paper's hypotheses that:
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1. When measuring accountability in city-counties institutions, most cases will generally
perform poorly, but;
2. In a county with a separated city where an authority board has been established to deliver
land ambulance service, this municipality will demonstrate better quantifiable
performance, and;
3. That these quantitative findings will be supported by a case study review in two selected
cases.

CHAPTER 4 - PRESENTATION OF GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT (GAT) TOOL
FINDINGS
In total, all 13 agreements were located and reviewed. Additionally, in each case following
the agreement review, the websites of each municipality involved in the agreements were
reviewed, looking to inform the GAT. The final scores for each agreement, listed by the
ambulance service name, are provided in table (4.1) below.
Table 4.1
Modified Governance Assessment Criteria

Services

Cornwall
Elgin
Essex-Windsor
FrontenacKingston
GuelphWellington
Hastings
Lanark

Public Access

Internal
Governance

Accountability

Number of
Municipalities
in
Partnership

Category score

Category score

Category
Score

Total Score

2
2
3

0.8
0.5
1.0

1.0
0.5
0.667

0.786
0.5
0.857

0.86
0.53
0.83

1.0

0.667

0.786

0.81

0.8

0.833

0.857

0.83

1.0
0.9

1.0
1.0

0.857
0.714

0.94
0.81

2
2
3
2
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Leeds &
Grenville
MiddlesexLondon
Perth
Peterborough
Renfrew
Simcoe

4
2
3
2
2
3

Average Score

0.8

1.0

0.571

0.77

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.7
1.0
1.0
1.0

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

0.786
0.857
0.786
0.857

0.83
0.94
0.92
0.89

0.885

0.987

0.786

0.843

No colour represents direct delivery by the designated CMSM
Blue represents some degree of contracted service delivery
Orange represents delivery through SPB

4.1 Public Access Performance
The domain of public access demonstrates generally strong performance. Despite the
variation from 0.5 to 1.0, the average for this domain score is 0.885.
These findings are overall not consistent with Spicer's previous study (2017). In his study,
the overall performance in public access was by contrast, very poor. At the time, this was
attributed to the challenges faced with obtaining the agreements with ease, or at all. In that study,
however, there were a total of 132 agreements reviewed (Spicer 2017) and were across multiple
sectors of service delivery. In this study, all 13 agreements were obtained. The only noted
variation on this was partial scores (0.5), which were given to those services that have a full or
partial model of contracted delivery. This was due to the fact that the CMSM agreements were
available to the public, but agreements for the contracted service were not. This is not surprising
given the allowances for non-disclosure under the Ontario Municipal Act (Municipal Act SO
2001).
Another finding noted on three agreements that affected the performance in this domain was
a lack of contact information for a designated individual at each municipality on the agreements.
This finding seems less consequential as the parties involved in the agreement are all clearly
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identified. These findings were all noted in services that are delivered directly by the
municipality.
Interestingly, in two cases, partial scores were deducted for public meetings and minutes.
This was noted in both a direct-delivery and contracted model. In both cases, this was the result
of evidence that a subcommittee exists to discuss ambulance service provision, but these
meetings did not yield evidence of public access, nor minutes of their proceedings. In both cases,
however, there was evidence of ambulance decisions being made at Municipal Council, which
was open to the public, with provided minutes.
Seven agreements satisfied all the domain requirements of public access. Six of which were
direct-delivery, with one being the only SPB service. An important component of ensuring that
the public can hold local governments accountable is access to information (Justice, Melitski,
and Smith 2006).
Slack (1993, 1997) states that citizens ought to know who they pay for service, and who they
can hold accountable for that service. In general, most of the agreements perform well in the
public access domain, with the strongest performances from direct and SPB delivery. Contracted
delivery suffers the most, given the lack of publically available information on the service
contract.
4.2 Internal Governance Performance
The domain of internal governance also demonstrates generally strong performance. It too
has variation from 0.5 to 1.0, with an average for this domain score of a solid 0.897.
In all but four of the 13 agreements reviewed score a complete 1.0 in this entire domain. For
those four that did not, they commonly saw their deductions coming from the added B5 question
“Do all municipalities have a voice through a board/committee?”. This cohort included three
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direct-delivery and one contracted delivery model. As previously stated, variations in this
criterion represent the extent of accountability that elected officials of municipalities not
designated the CMSM maintain for their communities. The scope of this project does not extend
into research regarding authorization, but there remain issues of accountability when there is no
elected official providing oversight or input into the service being delivered. Ultimately, voters
elect their representatives and have the ability to sanction them for their performance, as part of
the requirements for accountability (Fearon 1999; Ebrahim and Weisband 2007). However, when
elected officials play no role in the oversight of the service being provided, the ability to sanction
does not exist.
Further performance gaps were noted in particular with a contracted delivery model and
included no defined meeting schedule or standard by which to communicate between
municipalities.
Generally, all agreements performed well across this domain, with an average of 0.897. Of
note, the SPB delivery scores a complete 1.0, along with eight other ambulance services that
included direct and contracted delivery. Those that performed well all had either a joint
subcommittee or authority board that provides representation to the municipalities receiving
service, not designated the CMSM.
4.3 Accountability Performance
The domain of accountability is where performance appears to suffer on average (0.786),
with consistent variation from 0.5 to 1.0. This demonstrates that there are wider variations in
municipalities' commitment to ensuring transparency with service performance, by leaving the
community with not enough information by which to form a judgement on the service they are
receiving (Lyons and Spicer 2018).
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This domain is created as a means to provide insight into the ability for sanctions to be
placed upon the principal, within the accountability relationship (Brandsma and Schillemans
2012; Lyons and Spicer 2018). This becomes evident when reviewing the components of this
domain, with only one ambulance service creating a formal annual report. Of the remaining 12,
one provides some detail to the CMSM municipality’s annual report, while the other 11 provide
no annual reporting. This lack of consolidated information makes it difficult for the community
to have insight into the service that has been provided, form a cost-for-service analysis, and
ultimately sanction their decision-makers. The only service that does release an annual report,
was the SPB. This may be the result of the arms-length relationship that the SPB has with the
municipality, as it is not uncommon to see SPBs, like police services, release annual reports
(London Police Services Board 2021) to their community and municipal councils alike.
What’s more, only five of the services had a direct complaints process advertised on the
service website. This clear pathway for citizens to provide negative feedback is important in
demonstrating to the public that you are a service for them, and want to know when the mark is
missed. The eight remaining agreements were given partial scores as they all demonstrated
general inquiries contact information or instructions. This “laissez-faire” approach however does
not provide the same degree of assurance or clarity to the community that the service level being
provided is important, and how to provide feedback when it does not live up to their
expectations. Of the five that did satisfy the clear complaints process, four were direct-delivery
with the fifth being the SPB.
Other noteworthy findings were that three services did not provide a clear and detailed 2020
approved budget. Of these three, two were contract delivery models. In one of these cases, a total
dollar figure is available within the municipal budget, however, the details and breakdown of that
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spending were unavailable. In the other, no financial figures were readily available through the
service or county websites.
With such variation in performance across this domain, it was noted that those who
performed best were able to demonstrate a clear complaints process, detailed budget information
and in one case, an annual report that highlights the service performance. It should be noted that
in five services, the simple addition of such a complaints process and by releasing an annual
report would bring their performance to a 1.0, where the SPB performs. The SPBs performance
in this domain demonstrates its commitment to providing the community with enough
information for them to form a judgement and to levy sanctions, thereby satisfying the
accountability relationship (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012; Lyons and Spicer 2018).
4.4 Summative Scores
Having multiple municipalities in the chain of accountability reduces the transparency for the
public (Alcantara, Spicer, and Leone 2012). While the performance of land ambulance services
using the GAT is better than the scores observed in previous Ontario-based research (Spicer
2017), there is still variation in the overall performance across the 13 agreements and ambulance
services studied. The total scores ranged from 0.53 to 1.0. The average overall score was 0.836.
When considering the research question, which considers the governance model, the
following table (see table 4.2) details the overall average performance based upon the delivery
model.
Table 4.2
Delivery Model

Number of
CMSMs

Average Score

Full or Partial Contracting
Special Purpose Board
Direct Delivery

3
9
1

0.694
0.867
1.0
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It is clear by breaking down the delivery models that accountability performance changes
based upon the model chosen. It should be noted that the sample size for these models is small
overall, with significantly more direct delivery than contracting or SPB. It does, however,
generally find that direct and SPB perform significantly better than contracted delivery. In the
conclusion, further comparison of the SPB and direct-delivery will be explored.
CHAPTER 5 - DISCUSSION AND CASE STUDY
5.1 Discussion
With the completion of the GAT analysis, it is beneficial to look at a real-life case
comparison to determine if the GAT findings were consistent in two land-ambulance services
within Ontario. Further, by purposefully selecting the most similar cases whose only distinct
difference is that of the governance model, helps to strengthen previous studies' findings that
governance models have an impact on accountability in the real world.
5.2 Introduction of Case Study
As mentioned, this brief case analysis aims to better understand the findings in this study's
GAT analysis as well as those of previous work on governance models. To accomplish this
qualitative analysis, a most similar cases approach is completed. The one notable difference,
however, is the delivery model of the land-ambulance service.
There has been a significant amount of previous studies on the democratic performance
related to contract delivery (Breton 1996; Found 2012; Slack and Bird 2013), so it is not the
intention of this paper to focus too much on contract delivery. Further, the decisions around
determine a desire to contract out are often related to factors around efficiency, and not of
accountability. Therefore, this case study looks to compare SPB and direct delivery.
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What follows are two case examples of Ontario land-ambulance services. One of which is
delivered by an SPB (Middlesex-London Paramedic Service), and the other by direct delivery
(Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services). The first case described is Middlesex-London
Paramedic Service, which will outline the community it serves, who the designated CMSM is,
and some findings of the Service as it relates to the criterion of the GAT. Descriptions of
challenges noted in the media will be explored, along with barriers to the governance model.
Following that, Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services will be similarly outlined and
described, with attention to compare and contrast with the findings in Middlesex-London.
5.2.1 Middlesex-London Paramedic Service
Located in southwestern Ontario, Middlesex County and the City of London are roughly
near the midpoint of Detroit and Toronto (Lyons and Spicer 2018). London was incorporated as
a city and separated from Middlesex County in 1855 (Spicer 2016). Since then, London has been
involved in many annexations of the surrounding counties (Sancton 1998; Spicer 2016). Despite
this significant growth over the 160 years, the city continues to be linked to Middlesex County
through inter-local and CMSM agreements.
Geographically, the city-county region has 455,526 residents and covers 3,317.27 square
kilometers (Statistics Canada 2017b). The average 2015 household income was $83,802, and the
2021 approved land-ambulance budget for MLPS was $46,864,128 (London 2021).
The designated CMSM for land-ambulance is the County of Middlesex, which in October
2011 was created through a by-law the Middlesex London Emergency Medical Services
Authority (MLEMSA), known as Middlesex-London Paramedic Service (MLPS) (London
2011a). In its original formation, voting members included Middlesex County councilors and the
County Chief Administrative Officer (London 2011b).
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In 2020, the City of London raised concerns about the lack of board representation and
data being provided by the SPB to the city (London 2020a; Newcombe 2020). The concerns
raised about data were largely dismissed as the SPB releases an annual report through County
Council (Middlesex-London Paramedic Service 2020). However, the charge of board
representation was cause for action, and in response to these concerns, the County of Middlesex
amended the SPB composition to include elected representation from the City of London
(London 2020b).
When looking at the performance of MLPS’s SPB in the GAT, the agreement/landambulance service score a complete 18 points out of a possible 18 (see table 4.1). These findings
would have been poorer, had the GAT been completed prior to the change in board composition,
when the City of London was permitted Council representation. This proves to be an important
step forward in improving the SPBs overall accountability.
Crucial to the success in remaining accountability, the MLEMSA board holds public
meetings, with publically available agendas and minutes. Further, due to the SPBs arms-length
relationship with the County, MLPS presents an annual report and a detailed budget to both the
City and County, once approved by the SPB.
One of the design features of the MLEMSA board is that it does not have the authority to
levy taxes directly, and must receive budget approval from Middlesex County (London 2021).
This differentiates itself from common SPBs, such as police and public health boards, who have
independent abilities to levy taxes (Sancton 2015). This ensures that elected officials maintain
authority over the budget and taxation. Whether by design or not, this feature does improve
accountability and prevents the frequent criticism of SPBs, that they are a step removed from the
electoral process (Lyons 2020).
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When Lyons and Spicer examined SPBs and inter-municipal agreements in London, they
concluded that “SPBs perform much better than inter-local agreements, and some SPBs perform
much better than others” (2018, pp. 192). They note that SPBs who performed better were those
that provided a large amount of access and information to the public (Lyons and Spicer 2018).
This was because this information allows for the public more opportunity for scrutiny and to
hold elected officials to account.
When considering the local context of the MLEMSA, the findings of this study’s GAT,
and the previous examinations of other researchers, the results appear to be consistent. MLPS
performs well in the GAT because;


MLEMSA provides the public large amounts of data and information, and,



MLEMSA provides the partnering municipality a voice on the service provision through
board representation, and,



MLEMSA holds public meetings with available agendas and minutes, and,



MLPS provides a clearly stated complaints process for residents and service users to
submit concerns with service, and,



The County of Middlesex maintains the ultimate authority on budget and tax levy
approvals.
5.2.2 Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services

Turning the focus nearly 200km down Ontario’s highway 401, I will now consider the citycounty community of the County of Essex, City of Windsor, and Pelee Island. Incorporated in
1858 originally as Sandwich, Windsor has been separated from its surrounding rural counties
since (Windsor 2021). Similar to London, the City of Windsor has continued to grow through
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annexation but remains linked to neighbouring counties for municipal service delivery, namely
the Province’s CMSM program.
The first noted difference between these cases is the number of municipalities that are
involved in the region’s CMSM agreements. While Essex County and the City of Windsor are
joined by the Township of Pelee Island, the overall population and landmass, do not change the
ability to compare these cases. The region has a population of 398,953 (Statistics Canada 2017a)
and covers 1,850.90 square kilometers.
The average 2015 household income was $85,824, and the 2021 approved landambulance budget for EWEMS was $50,501,300 (Essex 2020).
Since the introduction of the CMSM program in Ontario, the County of Essex has been
the designated CMSM for land-ambulance, following a year-long arbitration process. The
arbitration process was concerning the financial cost-sharing of services downloaded as part of
the CMSM program (Rice 1999). Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services (EWEMS) was
officially formed in 2001, and over the course of 8 years, took over service for pre-existing
contracted land-ambulance providers to ultimately form a direct delivery model in 2009 (Duck
2016).
Following the arbitration, tensions were high as a result of merging the cultures by a
forced city-county partnership (Spicer 2016; Duck 2016a). These tensions continued into 2016
when local political debate went public over the land ambulance 2016 budget (Duck 2016a;
2016b). These tensions may explain some of the GAT findings today, that cause EWEMS to
suffer performance in accountability.
Overall, EWEMS’s GAT score is average. It scores 15 points out of 18 (0.83) with the
average total score for the 13 agreements being 0.836 (see table 4.1). The three points of
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deduction mostly come from areas of internal governance, with partial deductions in
accountability.
When completing the GAT for EWEMS, neither the CMSM agreement nor website data
provided a schedule of meetings (question B2) between partner municipalities, leaving the
business of land-ambulance to be discussed as needed, at Essex County Council meetings. This
finding was not common, as most CMSM agreements and other services provided a mechanism
for meetings, even if ad hoc, between municipalities. This finding does not provide a clear forum
for elected officials in Windsor or Pelee Island to bring service concerns forward to the CMSM,
leading to potentially uncomfortable or informal discussions.
The finding of scheduled meetings in combination with the lack of board or joint
subcommittee (B5) may explain why tensions have historically been high between the
municipalities. While the performance of the SPB was good in this regard, several other directdelivery and contracted services have established a joint committee. These official committees
with elected representatives are crucial at maintaining accountability. This is especially true for
the citizens of non-CMSM municipalities, who need an opportunity to sanction local
representatives. In the case of Essex-Windsor-Pelee Island, residents of Windsor and Pelee
Island have no apparent mechanism in ensuring their elected officials have a regular voice on
service provisions. If a member of the Public in Windsor is unhappy with their land-ambulance
service, their ability to sanction officials is non-existent.
Finally, EWEMS loses partial marks for their general inquiry contact information and
lack of identified complaints contact, as well as having limited information published within the
Essex County annual report, rather than a stand-alone complete report. It should be noted
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however that EWEMS is the only service to even go this far, besides the aforementioned
MLEMSA.
Overall, EWEMS performs well across the GAT. What’s more, the history of tensions
between Windsor and Essex (Duck 2016a; 2016b), following a year-long negotiation and
arbitration (Rice 1999) over CMSM agreements, could explain the findings of diminished
cooperation between the municipalities. These challenges are not inconsistent with many citycounty relationships, whose forced cooperation led to disagreements, tensions, and arbitrations
(Spicer 2015; 2016). In sum, considering this local context, the findings of this study’s GAT, and
previous analysis of tensions resulting from inter-municipal agreements, the results look to be
steady. EWEMS’s performance in the GAT would be improved by;


EWEMS publishing an independent annual report, and,



EWEMS providing a clear contact and process for citizen complaints, and,



The County of Essex establishing a joint land ambulance services committee.

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout the 1990s, Ontario underwent significant changes across the municipal
landscape. With the election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1995 under the promise to
lower taxes (Ibbitson 1997), the 1990s were a very turbulent time for municipalities (Spicer
2016). Local governments faced elimination and amalgamation (Siegel 2005), as well as a
realignment of service responsibilities (Graham and Phillips 1998). One of the products of this
realignment was the introduction of the CMSM program in 1998, which saw local municipalities
take on the delivery and partial funding for many services (Spicer 2015), including landambulance.
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Very quickly 37 designated CMSMs along with 10 district social services boards were forced
into inter-municipal services agreements (Spicer 2015). Previous research by Spicer has
demonstrated that these forced partnerships led to tensions and even legal challenges (2015,
2016), particularly in city-county institutions. Spicer states that this was a failed assumption by
the province that local governments would arrive at local solutions easily, even though citycounty institutions, created by the Province (2016), have a limited history of voluntary
cooperation (2015). Since the introduction of these agreements, research has been completed in
further understanding the CMSM organization and history of city-county institutions in Ontario
(Spicer 2015, 2016).
The complexity of city-county CMSM agreements, like many inter-local agreements, is
further affected by the governance models established to deliver these services (Lyons and
Spicer 2018). Special attention has been paid to the study of accountability in SPBs and other
inter-municipal partnerships (Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018; Lyons 2020).
As a result of the provincial realignment, Ontario has designated 55 CMSMs for land
ambulance service. Many of the CMSM designations were easily established, because of singletier, two-tier and regional organization (Spicer 2015). Further, with Indian Reserves and northern
Ontario services boards, what remains is 13 city-county regions that were largely left to organize
their own land-ambulance service agreements.
With such an important life-saving service (Aringhieri et al. 2017), what is equally important
is the delivery of that service. As Boyne notes, the performance of service delivery has always
been the subject and interest of scholars (2006). Critical to the calculus of performance is the
governance model with which the service is delivered (Longeway 2020).
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Therefore, decision-makers must consider the governance model when they look to ensure
the performance of the services they are accountable for. And, when forced into inter-municipal
cooperation and inter-local service delivery, it is important to recognize that these cooperative
agreements inherently blur the lines of accountability (Lyons and Spicer 2018). What is left for
elected officials forced into inter-local agreements, such as CMSMs, is to ensure that decisions
they have authority over, are made with optimum democratic performance in mind.
In order for municipalities to obtain sufficient information to make an important decision
around democratic performance, they must rely on the ongoing research of scholars into factors
that improve said performance. As mentioned, studies within Ontario have measured
accountability in inter-local agreements (Spicer 2017) and SPBs (Lyons and Spicer 2018).
Further, much review has been conducted on the establishment of the CMSM program, citycounty institutions, and their subsequent agreements (Spicer 2015, 2016).
Previous studies demonstrate that CMSM agreements and city-county institutions are unique
partnerships found in Ontario. This, combined with the research on a governance model’s effect
on accountability and inter-local agreements, what is left is to provide further empirical data
supporting the extent to which governance models in CMSM partnerships affect accountability.
In this study, the 13 land-ambulance services covering city-county institutions were analyzed
using a modified Governance Assessment Tool (GAT), previously used within the Ontario
context, to operationalize the performance of each ambulance service. The results of the GAT
were used to draw conclusions on how city-county land-ambulance services perform overall and
categorized into their governance models. As all governance models, direct and contract
delivery, as well as SPB, are represented in the 13 city-county land ambulance service, this
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allowed for a great opportunity to further study CMSM agreements, and the effect of governance
models on accountability.
To bolster the findings of the GAT, two cases were selected to look at a real-life case
comparison to determine if the GAT findings were consistent in two land-ambulance services
within Ontario. Further, by purposefully selecting the most similar cases whose only distinct
difference is their governance model, helps to strengthen previous studies' findings that
governance models have an impact on accountability in the real world (Lyons and Spicer 2018).
This paper finds that while land-ambulance services generally perform far better than
previous research (Spicer 2017), there is variation in accountability across the 13 land ambulance
services studied. Further, when the results of the GAT criteria are explored using a brief case
study comparing EWEMS and MLPS, the study finds that they are supported by real-case
examples of the challenges associated with city-county separation and inter-local service
agreements. Variation in performance is aligned with previous research (Spicer 2017; Lyons and
Spicer 2018) into inter-municipal agreements with various governance structures. In addition to
the above, observations noted in the case study, guided by GAT performance, provide objective
governance mechanisms that can be introduced to improve accountability.
The variation in accountability looks to be correlated to the delivery model selected by the
designated CMSM. Contracting the delivery of service appeared to be associated with poorer
performance in the GAT. This was largely attributed to the public access to information. As
many documents, such as the city-county CMSM agreement are available, the service contracts
were not. This is not surprising, however, as the Municipal Act (Municipal Act SO 2001) permits
these types of non-disclosure. Both direct delivery and SPB performed better on average than
private delivery, however, SPB outperforms direct delivery in the GAT. This result of GAT
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improvement with an SPB is consistent with previous literature (Spicer and Lyons 2018).
However, with the overall strong performance across all services, the individual criterion was
explored. What is observed is that the formation of a joint committee, with the representation of
elected officials from all parties involved in the agreement, appeared to be associated with strong
overall GAT performance.
Other areas where performance generally missed the mark were the publication of an annual
report and the creation of a specific and clear complaints process, separated from general
inquiries through the service or municipality. Although not completed by many, those few that
do satisfy this requirement, are ensuring that the public has access to sufficient information and a
mechanism for sanctioning the service. Both of these elements are essential to a complete
framework for accountability (Ebrahim and Weisband 2007).
While the SPB outperforms all other governance models, decision-makers may not be ready
to commit to this change. This is often a result of the authority board make-up, where Lyons
notes that board positions are often not directly elected, and are therefore a “step removed from
the electoral process” (2020, pp. 151). Despite this shortcoming, an SPBs design, which is at an
arms-length from the CMSM and with the commitment to one specific service (Sancton 2015;
Lyons 2020), appears to correlate with strong performance across the GAT. This is likely due to
this arm-length design, which lends itself to specific and separate avenues for communication,
annual reporting, and inter-municipal board representation.
The overall strong performance of land-ambulance service should not be surprising. Land
ambulance services are important, and expensive (Prno 2002). So it is not surprising that there is
a strong degree of oversight. However, those partnerships that approach the CMSM with
inclusive representation, despite their city-county separation, demonstrate improved
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performance. Municipalities and land-ambulance services should look to ensure they establish
land-ambulance joint committees that contain elected representation from every municipality
within the CMSM partnership. Further, they should ensure that they satisfy the established
frameworks for accountability, including providing the public with access to information and an
avenue for sanctions. This can be accomplished by ensuring that annual reports are published
and the ambulance service’s website contains a complaints process.
Future studies should continue in this area, as the frequency of inter-local agreements
continues to increase (Spicer 2017). While some challenge the authority of an SPB (Lyons
2020), on balance they appear to improve accountability performance in inter-municipal
agreements. Accountability in our most vital services, such as land-ambulance is crucial. For
services looking for an eloquent solution to improving accountability in CMSM program service
delivery, the establishment of an SPB, similar to that of Middlesex County, enables improved
performance to that of direct or contracted delivery.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A – List of City-County Institutions
City-County Region

Municipalities (upper-tier and separated
cities)

Simcoe County
Essex County
Wellington County
Middlesex County
Frontenac County
Peterborough County
Renfrew County
The United Counties of Leeds and Grenville

Lanark County

City of Barrie
City of Orillia
County of Simcoe
Windsor,
Essex County
Township of Pelee Island
Guelph
County of Wellington
London
County of Middlesex
Kingston
County of Frontenac
Peterborough
Peterborough County
Pembroke
Renfrew County
City of Brockville
Town of Gananoque
Town of Prescott
United Counties of Leeds and Grenville
Smith’s Falls
Lanark County

Elgin County

St. Thomas
Elgin County

Hastings County

City of Belleville
City of Quite West
The County of Hastings
Town of St. Mary’s
City of Stratford
Perth County
Cornwall
The United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and
Glengarry

Perth County
Cornwall
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Appendix B – Table of CMSM Agreements
CMSM Region

CMSM Agreement/By-Law

Date

Simcoe County

BY-LAW No. 4871
BY-LAW No. 5770

November 2002, April 2009

Essex County

Division of Costs Arbitration

March 1999

Wellington County

Municipal Service Management Agreement –
March 2000

March 2000

Middlesex County

BY-LAW No. 6353 – Creation of SPB
Land Ambulance Services Cost Apportion
Agreement
Municipal Service Management Agreement –
August 2005
Division of Costs Arbitration

October 2011, January 2018

May 1998, November 2003,
No date 2019

Renfrew County

BY-LAW No. 50-2003
BY-LAW No. 50-1998
Amendment to Appendix A of CMSM Agreement
– Unknown date 2019
Renfrew County and Pembroke Arbitration

The United Counties of
Leeds and Grenville

BY-LAW No. 03-39
Joint Operating Agreement – May 2000

May 2000, July 2003

Lanark County

BY-LAW No. 8017-2006, and
BY-LAW No. 2006-41, and
BY-LAW No. 8101-2007

September 2000, October
2006, December 2007

Elgin County

Consolidation Agreement Elgin/St. Thomas
Consolidation Plan for The County of Elgin and
City of St. Thomas

April 1998

Hastings County

BY-LAW No. 99-60
Municipal Service Management Agreement –
March 2000
BY-LAW No. 00-75
BY-LAW No. 2006-70
BY-LAW NO. 24-1998
BY-LAW No. 32-98
Municipal Service Management Agreement –
March 1998
Amendment Municipal Service Management
Agreement – January 2000
Amendment Municipal Service Management
Agreement – August 2003

September 1999, March 2000,
June 2000, April 2006

BY-LAW No. 001-2002
BY-LAW No. 002-2002
BY-LAW No. 095-2002
Municipal Service Management Agreement –
No By-Law No.

January 2002, June 2002, No
date in 2020

Frontenac County

Peterborough County

Perth County

Cornwall

July 2004, November 2004,
August 2005

January 2001

March 1998, January 2000,
August 2003
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Appendix C – Completed Modified Governance Assessment Tool
Modified Governance Assessment Criteria

Services

Cornwall
Elgin
Essex-Windsor
FrontenacKingston
GuelphWellington
Hastings
Lanark
Leeds &
Grenville
MiddlesexLondon
Perth
Peterborough
Renfrew
Simcoe
Average Score

Public Access

Internal
Governance

Accountability

Number of
Municipalities
in
Partnership

Category score

Category score

Category
Score

Total Score

2
2
3

0.8
0.5
1.0

1.0
0.5
0.667

0.786
0.5
0.857

0.86
0.53
0.83

1.0

0.667

0.786

0.81

0.8

0.833

0.857

0.83

1.0
0.9

1.0
1.0

0.857
0.714

0.94
0.81

0.8

1.0

0.571

0.77

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.7
1.0
1.0
1.0

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

0.786
0.857
0.786
0.857

0.83
0.94
0.92
0.89

0.885

0.987

0.786

0.843

2
2
3
2
4
2
3
2
2
3

No colour represents direct delivery by the designated CMSM
Blue represents some degree of contracted service delivery
Orange represents delivery through SPB

